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. Chapter 1: The Rationality Paradigm and Prospect Theory 
Empirical research in experimental economics has produced a series of results that have 
brought the rationality paradigm of economic theory into question. The rationality paradigm 
predicts a consistent pattern of individual behavior in the evaluation of prospects and trades. 
However, studies in experimental economics find recurring and systematic inconsistencies in 
evaluations of prospects and trades. These recurring and systematic inconsistencies undermine 
the rationality paradigm that predicts systematic, optimizing behavior. A 1979 study by 
. Kahneman and Tversky introduced an alternative descriptive model of economic behavior that 
they call "prospect theory." Kahneman and Tversky find divergent valuation in the coding of 
gains and losses of equal magnitude. Their studies led to the development of prospect theory to 
describe and predict decision behavior; prospect theory does not rely on a rigid pattern of 
optimizing behavior. 
Kahneman and Taversky's presentation of the prospect theory model begins with a series 
of survey questions that highlight divergences in human behavior and expected utility theory. 
These surveys evidence the systematic manner in which human behavior is dictated by factors 
such as framing effect, that is, externalities not relevant in typical economic incremental analysis 
and the rationality paradigm. The notion of framing effects of interest to this study is not that of 
the "half empty, half full" understanding of the proverbial water glass. The framing effects of 
interest are prior period outcomes of economic decision making, initial wealth position, and 
ownership entitlements. 
In the context of the K&T surveys, the framing effects utilized include the use of 
different prior period outcomes applied to current prospects, and varying initial reference 
position, that is, ownership or prospective ownership of a good's value. The results gathered 
from these surveys indicated a systematic pattern of human behavior relative to framing effects 
quite different to that predicted by expected utility theory; K&T concluded this behavior could 
be described by a function relating relative gains and losses to value. K&T call this the "value 
function. " 
The value function is a modification of the expected utility function, with the objective 
probabilities being replaced by subjective decision weights. In addition, the value function does 
not consider absolute wealth in valuing prospects, but a subjective reference position that 
changes based on the particular prospect being considered. The value function, V, is defmed 
~ .over changes in wealth rather than final asset position. For "regular" prospects (i.e. p + q < 1 or 
x ~ 0 ~ y or y ~ 0 ~ x) then the value of a prospect is given by 
V (x, p; y, q) = 7t(P)v(x) + 7t(q)v(y) 
If p + q = 1 and either x > y > 0 or x < y < 0 then 
V (x, p; y, q) = v(y) + 7t (P)[v(x) - v(y)] 
2 
Where V is the value of the prospect being considered, v is the value of a potential outcome of 
that prospect, p and q are probabilities, x and y are the possible outcomes, and 7t is the subjective 
decision weight replacing the objective probability of expected utility theory. 
The value function has three key features, each contributing to its richness and scope. 
First, the value function measures losses and gains relative to a natural reference point, 
. contrasting with the use of consumption or wealth in expected util ity theory. Measurement 
relative to a variant natural reference point accounts for the consequences of "frarning effects," 
which are externalities that often produce sub-optimal decision making. 
Second, the shape of the value function is concave for gains and convex for losses. This 
feature manifests itself in that large percentage changes in value are coded as being of more 
significance than smaller percentage changes in value-even if the changes are of equal absolute 
magnitude. The value function shape is in part based on the psychoanalytic principal that the 
difference between a and 100 seems greater than the difference between 1000 and 1100, 
regardless of the magnitude sign. The value function shape gives a graphical representation of 
the K&T finding that economic decisions favor risk seeking choices when evaluating two losses 
(choose the less probable, but higher expected value loss), and risk aversion when evaluating two 
gains (choose the more probable, but lower expected value gain). 
The third feature is that the value function for losses is more steeply sloped than the value 
function for gains; this is referred to as "loss aversion"-that is, losses are weighted substantially 
more (in terms of value) than gains of equal magnitude. The disutility associated with the loss of 
x dollars being greater than the utility associated with the winning of x dollars is unique and 
represents the divergent coding of losses and gains that is central to prospect theory (Thaler, 
1980). 
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The implications this divergent theory are 
of an analytical to study the many 
The framework of nrl"\(lf'\PC'T theory can be to 
economic decisions are F or instance, 
making, an analysis of period gains and 
reaching and allow 
that pervade pv''''p .... rn'''' ... j~''' 
development 
economics. 
the manner which 
gains and losses 
would be useful in the development of a 
forecasting model of economic decision making. Another example is that if value does change 
upon the of ownership rights, is which is determined by 
sellers, a true measure 
such as determining 
nnl'rpl'lT value? This is of particular 
domain cases. compensatory value in "lA'."'''''' 
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Chapter 2: Implications of Prospect Theory 
The implications of prospect theory and function are best when 
related to specific "'''''CU''I-''''''' where prospect theory can accurately explain '"'Vl.' .. ,. .. ,. ..... 'n 
rational behavior. example is and losses 
behavior (Thaler and Johnson, 1990). The traditional of disciplines such as economics and 
decision science only incremental future costs are relevant in the of 
prospects and trades. ..... "\M ... ''' .. r empirical evidence ,\.I.".",,, • .:> the effect of sunk costs "sunk 
gains") to influence (Laughhunn and Payne, 1984). In the prospect theory 
costs are classified as due to the """",,<llr<>t,,, .... "UH.'I". the two sides of an '-,'-...... "".1:';'- or 
transaction. That is, the value up is viewed as one event and the value gained as 
event (this is of gains and Regardless of the cornp€~ns,:l.tlo 
received in an exchange, value sacrificed is coded as a loss when viewed in isolation. 
Laughhunn and Payne (1984) recognize that most "Y'><I,IrP'"'' are affected by prior 
outcomes. 
The Effect of Prior Period . liThe House Money ,..n'lCIirlP'--
Thaler and Johnson (1990) went further and examined manner in which the framing 
of prior gains and a .. H\_"'"':> decisions under In(','''rT!:l and Johnson (1990) 
hypothesized that not only and losses dramatically influence subsequent period 
.......... " ........ ,J .. but they do so in ways. Kahneman (1 found that some 
that prior outcomes expectation or level unrelated to the 
current status quo. These occur when evaluations of current prospects and trades 
the reference point by a related act (that $100 on your first bet a 
\Ja.;)'UV will elicit more risky than one would otherwise in. If your stock market 
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portfolio gains $100 in value and then you go to the casino, this more risky behavior would not 
be observed.). This is referred to as the "house money" effect. 
While the convex shape of the value function over the domain of losses predicts risk-
seeking behavior in the domain for losses, certain empirical evidence suggests otherwise. One 
explanation for this departure from risk seeking behavior over the domain of losses is that prior 
period losses are not integrated in evaluating prosp~cts and trades when the risky alternative does 
not offer the chance to break even (given the amount of the prior period loss). While certain 
empirical evidence questions the descriptive accuracy of the value function, there are many 
examples of support for the value function. An example of the descriptive accuracy of the value 
function is the observation of risk seeking behavior over the domain for losses when prior period 
losses are integrated with current period prospects. This tends to occur when the prospect allows 
for the potential to break even--offsetting prior losses with a gain of equal magnitude. The 
tendency to accept "break even" prospects over the domain of losses is explained by the strong 
preference to return to one's originally established reference point. The strong preference to 
remain at or return to one's originally established reference point is referred to as a "status-quo 
bias." 
The value function describes a prior period gain as resulting in more risk-seeking 
behavior. A higher degree of risk tolerance is exhibited when current period losses are integrated 
with prior gains, particularly when the prior gain is larger than the potential loss. The assessment 
of gains and losses relative to the reference point associated with a large prior period gain offsets 
the manifestation of loss aversion and expands the degree of risk-seeking behavior in the domain 
. of large prior period gains (Thaler and Johnson 1990). 
6 
The Endowment Effect 
In addition to offering an explanation house money and loss ''''".,.'''''" 
prospect theory offers an explanation for inconsistencies in buying and 
existence endowment and the evaluation of opportunity and sunk costs. 
Each of phenomena is anomalous light of the rationality ___ ."' ... of 
economic theory. However, empirical evidence supports the existence of each of these 
phenomena, and prospect can why these persist. 
1aJ.:>1"""'1 economic .,,"'''' ... , assumes an individual's maximum ngI1leSS to pay 
for a good (WTP) and minimum compensation demanded the same (WTA) should be 
negligible when income '-'LH ...... '" are small (Kahneman, Knetsch, and Thaler, 1990). However, 
provide 1"''''''''-'''' contradicting this maxim. (1980) that the 
minimal compensation demanded for accepting a .00 I of death (WT A) was significantly 
higher (by more than an of magnitude difference!) than maximum amount the same 
individual was to pay to the same .00 I risk of (WTP). 
Possible causes this include demand for 
compensation for agreeing to the loss of a public good 1980). Bargaining habits also 
contribute to "",r·n"" ... t buying selling prices, as it is typical for a to offer and a 
to " ............... " by bidding low. when misstating an individual's true valuation 
offers no advantage, such as answering hypothetical questions or single bid/offer mark~ts, 
individuals are to this bargaining bias. cause of buying-selling discrepancy 
is as a strategic mistake, which an experienced individual will learn to avoid over 
(Coursey, and ..., ............ , 1987; Brookshire and Coursey, 1987). 
The cause of the WT NWTP that is of for present IS 
the existence different reference positions affecting preferences, and not force of habit 
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mistakes (Thaler, 1980). Thaler the phenomena of the assignment of increased to a 
good once that good become of an individual's ..... ", .. "nn endowment the "endowment 
" The endowment of the aversion characteristic 
prospect This asymmetry that the act of selling a good is as a loss the 
acquisition of a is viewed as a gain. On average, will ~~.,.., .. a higher value to 
a than potential reducing set of mutually acceptable trades (Kahn em an, 
Knetsch, 1990). The endowment effect is more pervasive in markets for consumption 
goods, due to the of value ambiguity on preferences. Evidence 
for """""l1'''UI:'~'"' goods would not expected to be observed when 
endowment effect in 
value is 
predetermined. However, van Dijk van Knippenberg (1996) found evidence that 
endowment effect may persist in markets exchange when are uncertain about 
exchange 
existence of endowment effect can be examined from a cost analysis 
.cCIOB(nnIC theory states that all costs are in some capacity opportunity costs. Hence 
opportunity costs should evaluated same manner as out-of-pocket costs. prospect 
theory, the benefit sacrificed and benefit that result from an exchange are viewed 
separately, with sacrifice coded as a loss and benefit being coded as a 
The shape of the value function implies that if out of pocket costs are viewed as losses (a 
reduction in wealth position) they be more weighted than opportunity cost of 
gams the gain acquisition of a good). (1980) uses this underweighing of 
opportunity costs as an alternative explanation of endowment This explanation of 
endov.ment effect itself in two different ways. From seller the out of 
pocket cost that is coded as a for a good is of greater negative magnitude than 
8 
opportunity cost of not receiving the benefit of the offered monetary value. From the buyer 
the out-of-pocket cost (that is as a when viewed in isolation) of money to 
the good is OTP'o::It"'T negative utility magnitude the opportunity cost of not 
receiving the benefit relating to the acquisition of good. In addition to explaining 
of endowment this also presents ...... "'.u .... '" of status-quo 
bias that a utility premium must be offered to entice one to leave their established wealth 
position or status quo. 
Summary 
The house money and the endowment effect are two phenomena that are testable 
an experimental setting. in which value assessments are elicited 
subjects with initial ,.""+;",,.,,,'n,,,,, positions provide an opportunity to observe whether 
endowment CUJ."''-''.;:' valuations and preferences. The experimental structure allows 
observation the endowment or In addition, the effect is also 
in the following context. 'AU1 •• U" ......... wealth is a function of outcomes a;:,~.v .... 'a ... , .... 
with risky prospects. Subsequent behavior observed in subjects with new wealth positions 
allows the relationship wealth position behavior to studied. 
9 
Chapter 3: Research Problem and Hypotheses 
This paper will examine the existence and significance of the endowment effect and the 
framing effect of wealth position in evaluating prospects and trades under uncertainty. 
Experimental evidence of these phenomena can be explained by the descriptive power of 
prospect theory, particularly as it pertains to the effect of reference position on preferences. 
Furthermore, the descriptive power of the value function is analyzed. Evidence of the 
endowment effect is examined in the context of markets for goods of uncertain, randomly 
determined value, with determinant expected value. The degree to which the effect of 
cumulative wealth affects valuation behavior is also examined. In addition, the degree to which 
. learning reduces bargaining behavior pricing biases in a market setting will be examined. 
Finally, the scope of the endowment effect will be qualified by analyzing the effect of broadened 
seller behavior in the market setting. 
Prospect Theory and the Endowment Effect: Hypotheses 
The primary focus of this study is to analyze the manifestation of the endowment effect 
in a market for goods under uncertainty. The endowment effect should prevail in market 
settings, with buying prices lower than selling prices. The endowment effect is persistent over 
'. time. It is not an anomalous behavior that diminishes in intensity due to the effect of learning. 
Cumulative wealth position influences economic decision making in current periods. Prospect 
theory predicts that behavior is more risky in the domain of gains which is known as the "house 
money" effect. Risk tolerance also influences economic decisions under uncertainty. More risk 
tolerance will relate to higher valuation of a good with uncertain prospects. 
The first hypothesis, HI a, relates to the persistent divergence of buyer and seller 
valuations of a good; it is stated as follows: 
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H la: In markets for goods under uncertainty, seller valuations will on average be 
greater than buyer valuations. 
Valuation is price or value assigned to the good where the subject would be indifferent 
between the good and the price or value in cash. This state will not be due solely to the 
manifestation of common bargaining behavior practices, since learning over repeated markets 
leads to more consistent valuations of both buyers and sellers. The research hypothesis HI b 
leads to a test for loss aversion and status-quo bias (elements of prospect theory behavior) in both 
buyers and sellers. The preferences exhibited by good valuations are not changed with learning, 
since they are the result of reference positions, not misunderstanding of the market setting: 
HI b: Learning in previous market settings will not correct for divergence observed in 
buyer and seller valuations. 
The effect of cumulative wealth will create a framing effect that will affect the valuation 
of the good. This will be due in part to the "gambling with the house money" phenomenon. The 
"house money" phenomenon is a manifestation of the more risk tolerant behavior observed over 
the domain of gains than losses. High cumulative wealth is achieved by the acquisition of goods 
of uncertain value that increase in value. Therefore, high cumulative wealth implies prior period 
gains, which should lead to more risk tolerance, which is measured by higher valuation of the 
uncertain value good. The following hypotheses (H2a and H2b) allow us to test for the presence 
of this phenomenon: 
H2a: In a market setting, higher levels of cumulative wealth at the begirming of a 
market will induce higher valuations of the good of uncertain value. 
H2b: Wealth position and risk-tolerance are positively correlated in a market setting for 
goods of uncertain value. 
II 
Since the is of uncertain value, risk ... rc> ...... ,.., will inherently affect valuation, 
even if the endowment is influencing valuation as well. It is expected 
utility theory that more risk tolerant agents do not discount a prospect because of higher return 
deviations, as the following hypotheses indicate: 
H3a: For all valuations will be associated with greater risk 
tolerance, due to the decreased discounting of uncertainty by tolerant agents. 
H3b: Manifestation the endowment effect induces higher valuations uncertain 
value good for sellers buyers of similar 
These hypotheses will test for the of the endowment effect and framing effects 
in the evaluation of prospects and trades. Risk averse and risk-seeking behavior is an 
unavoidable externality the analysis of the endowment effect in markets for goods of uncertain 
value. ignoring this experimental condition, the 
IS nre:sellt is tested by comparing subjects in both buyer and 
to which the endowment 
roles with similar risk profiles. 
allows for the separation of risk tendency from the endowment 
more conclusive data. 
analysis, and therefore 
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Chapter 4: Experimental Design and Methodology 
phenomena of externalities economic decision-making are readily testable 
in an context. Thaler (1980, 1990), Kahneman and (1979), 
Kujal, Michelitsch, Smith, and Deng (1996), van Dijk and van Knippenberg (1996), and 
Kahneman, Knetsch, and Thaler (1990) each argue that the endowment effect persists in 
economic decision-making. and Blumer (1985), Staw (1976), Thaler (1980) each argue 
that costs (costs in prior periods) a on current ""PT'"'' decision-
making. This contrasts with the rational agent hypothesis central to economic theory that states 
that sunk costs are to be ignored. Laughhunn and Payne (i 984) expanded the scope the study 
of how prior period outcomes current period decisions under uncertainty by investigating 
how prior period gains, which they label "sunk gains," affect decisions. 
provide of significant impact PVTPTTI can on decision 
Of particular interest to this study is the prior evidence of the endowment effect irr markets of 
uncertainty, and the effect prior period losses and gains on current period decision making. 
Experimental markets are to test for the existence of the endowment effect under 
uncertainty and current of prior period outcomes. use experimental 
markets allowed control over the subjects' initial endowment and wealth position relative to the 
experiment. These factors are difficult to evaluate naturally occurring markets, as the impact 
of behavior and period outcomes are difficult to assess. 
Experimental markets can provide support for the predictions of the endowment 
and other quasi-rational hypotheses. In addition, experimental markets provide evidence that 
behavior is consistent with the of nrr'Cnpf'T theory under In(,,'''rt,,, 
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Specifically, actual human behavior is not accurately characterized by the rational, optimizing 
behavior that is central to neoclassical economics. 
Experimental Market 
Forty-five students participated in the experiment. Twenty-six students comprised group 
one and nineteen students comprised group two. Within each group, paid subjects were 
randomly assigned positions (buyer or seller) which would remain constant over the three market 
periods of the experiment. Subjects were volunteers taking an intermediate cost accounting 
course at The Ohio State University. They were advised of the time commitment of 
approximately 80 minutes, and informed that the expected payment was $3.75, with higher and 
lower payments possible depending on their performance and whether or not they held winning 
lottery tickets over the course of the experiment. The experiment took place during regularly 
scheduled class time. 
The market setting allowed for the collection of value assessments of an uncertain value 
lottery ticket with expected value of $.50 from subjects in the role of either buyer or seller. 
"Valuation" was explained to subjects to mean the indifference value between the lottery ticket 
and that monetary pay-out. Once valuations were collected, a market price was determined by 
, taking the median value assigned to the lottery tickets by the subjects, irrespective of their buyer 
or seller designation. In this way, the scope of seller behavior was expanded to make sellers also 
potential buyers, should their valuations be higher than the median group valuation. This design 
was introduced into the experimentation to minimize the valuation discrepancy due to standard 
bargaining behavior. The overall experimental design also sought to eliminate the effect of 
bargaining behavior by stressing the one-valuation-per-market structure of the experiment and 
that there would be no haggling or over-the-counter trades. This introduced a dynamic ticket 
14 
variable design into the experiment. This incomplete market structure meant that the number of 
outstanding tickets at the end of each market varied and that the "market price" was not a 
market-clearing price in the true economic sense. 
Experimental Task 
The subjects had economic incentives consistent with a person evaluating the prospects 
of a fair lottery ticket under uncertainty., The two possible outcomes and the method of outcome 
determination were explained within information packets distributed to subjects. Subjects were 
also given the opportunity to ask questions about the instructions and/or any aspect of the 
experimental procedure. 
There were two types of information packets, one for buyers and one for sellers. Each 
buyer information packet stated that the subject had a $1.25 credit and the opportunity to 
purchase a lottery ticket. Seller information packets stated that the subject had $.75 credit and a 
lottery ticket. The lottery ticket would payout either $1.00 or $0 depending on the outcome of a 
random card drawing (a heart of diamond drawn at random indicated a particular ticket was a 
winner, a club or spade drawn indicated that a particular ticket was a loser). Subjects were told 
that there would be three markets, each with a separate lottery. Each lottery ticket would be 
valid only for the market during which it was distributed. Subjects were asked to write down 
>how much the described lottery ticket was worth to them (this assessment is referred to as the 
subject's "valuation" of the lottery ticket). While subjects assessed the value of the lottery 
tickets they were instructed that once they had finished, the information packets would be 
collected and evaluated to determining the market price. The exact mechanism for determining 
the market price was not described to the subjects. After the collected valuations were assessed, 
the market price was announced to the subjects. After exchanges were made and the lottery was 
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conducted, subjects were asked to calculate their ending wealth position and repeat the lottery 
ticket valuation. For the second market, subjects were advised that in addition to any market one 
wealth accumulated that they also had an additional $.75 and a new lottery ticket (for sellers) or 
an additional $1.25 (for buyers). The subjects were advised of the same conditions for the 
beginning of the third market. 
Post Experimental Procedures, Endowment, and Rewards 
At the conclusion of the market three exchanges and lottery, subjects were directed to 
complete a risk profile questionnaire. The risk profile assessment consisted of the evaluation of 
nine two option scenarios. Each scenario offered the option for a certain lump sum of money or 
the chance at either of two sums of money with known probabilities attached. Three of the 
scenarios offered fair, risk neutral options. Three scenarios offered options with the lump sum 
having a greater expected value than the option with the chance at either of two sums with 
known probabilities attached. Finally, three scenarios offered options with the option with the 
chance at either of two sums with known probabilities attached having greater expected value 
than the option with a certain lump sum pay-out. 
As each subject completed the risk assessment, they were paid in cash their cumulative 
earnings and/or winnings for the three market periods. No compensation was based on answers 
. >provided on the risk assessment. Prior to the beginning of the experiment, all subjects were 
informed that they would keep any money given to them, acquired through the sale of lottery 
tickets, and won in the lottery. For each market, both buyers and sellers were each given assets 
with an expected value of $1.25 . Buyers were gi ven $1.25 in the form of a credit, sellers were 
given one lottery ticket (which only could be used in the market it was designated for) with an 
expected value of$,50 and $.75 credit. 
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Chapter 5: Analysis of Results 
For group one, average compensation was $3.65 for buyers and $3.62 for sellers. Group 
two results showed buyers with average compensation of $3.61 and sellers $3.85. The 
divergence in group two buyer and seller compensation could have been the result of exuberant 
lottery ticket valuation on the part of sellers. This in turn led sellers to retain their lottery ticket 
and in many cases acquire a second lottery ticket over the course of the three markets. With 
sellers having multiple opportunities to realize the potential $1.00 prize from winning lottery 
tickets, they were able to earn compensation $.24 greater than their buyer counterparts in group 
two. 
The analysis of this experiment is concerned with studying evidence of two primary 
phenomena. The first phenomenon is higher valuations assigned to the lottery tickets by sellers 
who are already in possession of a lottery ticket than buyers who are given a monetary 
entitlement (hypotheses H1a and H1b). To this end, valuation data is collected for each subject 
for each of the three markets, and average valuation for each subject is calculated (see table 5.1). 
Table 5.1: Average Valuations by Group and Classification 
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The second phenomenon is higher valuations assigned to the lottery tickets by subjects (both 
buyers and sellers) with a high cwnulative wealth level. wealth at end of each market 
is calculated by the subject and verified by the instructor for each subject table 
Table 5.2 Correlation between Wealth Level and Valuation 
In addition to these two issues, the relationship of risk tolerance level and lottery ticket valuation 
IS examined. This will determine the 11"",'T .. ",,,, to which tolerance, as measured by the risk 
assessment translates into higher lottery ticket valuations by subjects. 
1& 
Evidence of the Endowment Effect 
Hypothesis la states that over each of the three the of markets 
one through three there would be divergence in values assigned to the tickets by subjects 
given a lottery than by not given a lottery for group one is shown 
below (see 5.3): 
Table Group I Subject Valuations 
Sellers Mkt 1 Mkt2 MktJ Average 
'I 0.6 0.51 0.51 0.54 
2 0.38 0.6 0.6 0.526667 
3 0.75 0.75 0.85 0.783333 
4 0.75 0.75 1 0.B3~~ 
5 0.01 0.25 0.5 0.253 • 
6 0.5 0.51 0.65 0.553333 
7 0.5 0.5 0.75 0.583333 
8 1 0.75 0.5 0.75 
9 1 1 1 1, 
10 0.5 0.75 0.25 0.5 
11 0.25 0.5 1 0.583333' 
12 1 0.75 0.76 0.836667 
13 0.5 0.75 'I 0.75 
Mean 0.59 .643846 0.720769 0.6533331 
Std. Dev. 1 0.30 0.189012 0.243942 0.194503 
Buyers Mkt 1 Mkt2 Mkt J Average 
14 0.42 0.75 0.25 0.473333 , 
15 0.5 0.25 0.3 0.35 
16 0.5 0.75 0.5 0.583333, 
17 0.4 0.5 0.5 0.466667 
18 0.95 0.8 0.6 0.783333 
19 0.5 0.75 1 0.75, 
20 0.5 1 0.75 0.75 
2'1 0.4 0.5 0.75 0.55 
22 0.351 0.55 0.4 0.433333 
23 0.75 0.6 0.5 0.616667 
24 0.75 1 0.733333 
25 0.5 0.75 0.65 0.633333 
26 0.75 0.75 0.75 0.75 
Mean 0.536154 0.66~ 0.611538 0.60SR41 
Std. Dev. 0.173663 0.186568 0.236426 0.143394 
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For markets one and three, average seller valuations exceeded average buyer valuations by .06 
and .11 respectively. Market two data observed an average buyer valuation .03 greater than the 
average seller valuation. The divergent result of market two may be attributable to a number of 
factors, such as a slightly higher risk level affecting buyer valuations, as buyers sought to recoup 
market one losses. The market two anomalies could also be due to sellers wishing to lock in 
their accumulated wealth and not risk losing on a lottery ticket priced in excess of its expected 
value. Despite the market two anomaly, overall for group one seller valuations averaged $.05 
more than buyer valuations. The group one data provides supporting evidence of the endowment 
effect. 
For group two, seller valuations exceeded buyer valuations for each of the three markets 
by .10, .13, and .09 respectively. Overall for group two, average seller valuations exceeded 
buyer valuations by .10. For each market, sellers on average valued the tickets more highly than 
buyers. This evidence also supports the existence of the endowment effect (see table 5.4). 
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Group 2 Subject Valuations 
Sellers Mkt 1 Mkt 2 Mkt3 Average 
1 1 1.25 1,5 1.25 
2 0,5 0,25 0.36 0.37 1 
3 0,45 0,45 0.5 0.466667 
4 0.8 0.2 0.1 0.366667i 
5 1 1 0.75 0.916667 
6 0.5 0.75 0.75 0.666667 
7 1 1 0.5 0.833333 
8 0.5 0 0.35 0.283333i 
9 0 0.1 0.35 0.15j 
10 0.5 0.5 02 0.41 
Mean 0.625 0,55 0.536 0.570333 
Std. Dev. 0.322533 0.430116 0.39814 0.34006 
Buyers Mkt 1 Mkt2 Mkt3 Average 
11 0.5 0.5 0 0.333333 
• 
12 0.5 0.5 a 0.333333 
13 0.25 1 0.583333 
14 0.25 0.4 0.45 0.366667 
15 1 0.25 0 0.416667 
16 0.5 0.25 0.5 I 0.416667 
17 0.25 0.62 0.63 0.5 
18 0.5 0.25 0.75 0.5 
19 1 0 1.25 O.466~ Mean 0.527778 0.418889 0.453333 
Std. Dev. 0.291667 0.285633 0.414548 0.135401 
of the test groups on average demonstrated higher seller than buying 
of quasi-rational economic phenomena state that higher buyer than valuations is common 
to standard to multi-period 
. Standard bargaining behavior is the observation that initial buyer willingness to accept 
being .... l.:>U;U'-,y and initial willingness to pnces understated. It is observed 
continued to exhibit outcome higher seller valuations. 
over course of a three-market setting is unable to eradicate the buyer valuation 
differential. of this evidence the notion of the endowment to 
some responsible for the divergent seller valuations. 
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These observations suggest that the endowment effect influences seller valuations in 
markets of uncertainty. Hypothesis H 1 b states that learning over markets one and two will not 
correct the divergent buyer and seller valuations, as market three seller prices will remain higher 
than market three buyer prices. To minimize the buyer seller value deviations due to bargaining 
behavior, subjects were informed that this was a one valuation no haggling market. In addition, 
the three period market also would allow for learning to take place. The effect of learning in a 
market setting is that buyer and seller valuations converge, as subjects realize exchanges will not 
take place at over or understated valuations. The failure of buyer and seller valuations to 
converge over multiple markets is indicative of other factors at work, including the endowment 
effect. Observed market three seller valuations exceeded market three buyer prices for both 
group one and two by .10 and .04, respectively. In neither group was this the smallest magnitude 
buyer/seller valuation divergence. The observation of persistent divergences in buyer and seller 
valuations indicates that learning over market one and two does not eliminate the divergence. 
Another possible factor causing the buyer seller valuation divergence is that buyers are less risk 
tolerant than sellers. If buyers are less willing to take the risk of the lottery ticket, they will value 
it less, instead opting to retain a certain amount of money. The influence of risk propensity on 
buyer and seller behavior is taken up more thoroughly in the analysis of evidence of hypotheses 
. , H3a and H3b. In summary, the data presented in the above analysis supports evidence that an 
endowment effect indeed manifests itself in the seller valuation decision. 
Cumulative Wealth Effects: "Gambling with the House Money" 
The effect initial reference positions on preferences is examined in the context 
markets of uncertainty by observing how the framing effect of cumulative wealth level affects 
subjects' of a lottery phenomenon derived from IJV"LU,'",",;:;' of prospect 
yheory is that economic agents set up unique mental accounts different economic decision 
environments. That is, it is wealth relative to a particular environment that current 
on··m'lKlng, not the absolute level of wealth. manner which evidence of 
with house money" is tested is explicated formally in hypothesis 
Evidence of a greater cumulative wealth resulting in higher lottery ticket valuations is due 
to more risk tolerant behavior being exhibited in a given environment a subject has 
accumulated wealth that environment. The "gambling with the house money effect", or 
"wealth " is by relationship n"'UfF' .. n in wealth position and 
valuation behavior among individual subjects. The correlation beginning of period two 
wealth and period two valuation, and v .... E .... u.u of three wealth and period valuation 
is also to lr,,, ... r,, ... any general relationship between wealth and valuations across 
subject groups. all receive identical beginning period one entitlements all 
receive identical beginning of period one entitlements, there is no possibility to observe 
"wealth gambling with the house money in period one. 
of individual wealth shows that seven of twenty-four 
subjects group one more risk tolerant valuation for markets two and three 
corresponding to higher beginning of period two and three wealth levels, respectively. As shown 
in table five In group one a positive between these two 
variables for market three. failure these five subjects to demonstrate the wealth effect 
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may be due to slower learning of the market structure. Of the remaining group one subjects, one 
exhibited a negative wealth effect in both markets two and three valuations. The thirteen 
remaining subjects demonstrated erratic valuation behavior relative to changing wealth level. 
Again, this may be due to slower learning of the market structure for these subjects. This 
analysis of individual behavior provides evidence that amongst individual subject data there is 
indication of a weak relationship between wealth position and valuation (see table 5.5). 
Table 5.5: Group 1 Subject Wealth and Valuation Patterns 
Sellers Beg. Mkt 1 Wealth Mkt 1 Valuation Beg. Mkt 2 Wealth Mkt 2 Valuation Beg. Mkt 3 Wealth Mkt 3 Valuation 
1 0.75 0.6 3 0.51 4.5 0.51 
2 0.75 0.38 2 0.6 3.5 0.6 
3 0.75 0.75 1 0.75 3 0.85 
4 0.75 0.75 3 0.75 5 1 
5 0.75 0.01 2 0.25 3.5 0.5 
6 0.75 0.5 2 0.51 3.5 0.65 
7 0.75 0.5 2 0.5 3.5 0.75 
8 0.75 1 1 0.75 1 0.5 
9 0.75 1 2 1 4 1 
10 0.75 0.5 2 0.75 4 0.25 
11 0.75 0.25 2 0.5 3.5 1 
12 0.75 1 1 0.75 1 0.76 
13 0.75 0.5 2 0.75 3 1 
Mean 0.75 0.595384615 1.923076923 0.643846154 3.307692308 0.720769231 
Std. Dev. 0 0.300516649 0.640512615 0.189012277 1.164375039 0.243941986 
Buyers Beg. Mkt 1 Wealth Mkt 1 Beg. Mkt 2 Wealth Mkt 2 Beg. Mkt 3 Wealth Mkt 3 
14 1.25 OA2 2.5 0.75 4 0.25 
15 1.25 0.5 2 0.25 3.25 0.3 
16 1.25 0.5 2 0.75 3.5 0.5 
17 125 OA 2.5 0.5 3.75 0.5 
18 1.25 0.95 3 0.8 3.5 0.6 
19 125 0.5 3 0.75 3.5 1 
20 1.25 0.5 2 1 2.5 0.75 
21 1.25 OA 2.5 0.5 3.75 0.75 
22 125 0 .35 2.5 0.55 3.75 OA 
23 1.25 0.75 3 0.6 4.25 0.5 
24 1.25 OA5 2.5 0.75 3 1 
25 125 0.5 2 0.75 3.25 0.65 
26 1.25 0.75 3 0.75 4 .5 0.75 
Mean 1.25 0.536153846 2.5 0.669230769 3.576923077 0.611538462 
Std. Dev. 0 0173663394 0.40824829 0.186568197 0.524251603 0.236426386 
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At the group level, results indicate that sellers did not exhibit evidence cumulative 
wealth level and lottery ticket valuation to be strongly related. Market two cumulative wealth 
and valuation correlation for buyers is actually 
between cumulative wealth and valuation is inversely 
indicates that the actual relationship 
for A negati ve 
correlation may indicate a "regret" or "correction" effect in which subjects change the manner in 
which they value the lottery ticket. Market three results show an extremely weak positive 
correlation of .19. Neither of these measures is indicative of a strong relationship between 
wealth valuation behavior. Group one results for buyers indicate similarly 
inconsistent relationships between cumulative wealth and valuations. Market two cumulative 
wealth and valuation correlation is very weakly related with a positive correlation of 
.08. market three relationship exhibits a negative relationship between cumulative wealth 
and valuation of negative correlation indicates that lottery ticket valuation actually 
"""",,_1\_,0..:>1..,,," as cumulative wealth 
Similarly to group one, group two subjects are analyzed for evidence of a wealth 
phenomenon affecting valuations behavior on an individual level. of nineteen subjects 
exhibited or decreased valuations with increases or decreases in wealth position, 
An additional six of the nineteen demonstrated this relationship in their market 
three valuations. Again, the failure of these six subjects to exhibit this wealth 
to failure to learn the market structure quickly. Two of the nineteen subjects in group two 
a relationship between wealth level valuation level for markets two and 
three. The remaining of the nineteen subjects in group two exhibited erratic valuation levels 
relative to wealth position. study of individual subjects demonstrating a wealth 
valuation relationship is consistent with the of the group one subjects. Weak evidence 
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supports the of wealth level affecting valuation level in individual subjects (see table 
5.6). 
Table 5.6: Group 2 Subject Wealth and Valuation Patterns 
Sellers Beg. Mkt 1 Wealth Mkt 1 Beg. Mkt 2 Wealth Mkt2 Beg. Mkt 3 Wealth Mkt3 
1 
==: 2,00 1.25 2.55 1.50, 2 2.00 025 3.20 0.36! 
3 0.75 I 0.45 2,00 0,45 3.20 0.50 i 
4 0.75 0.80 1.00 0.20 2.20 0.10 
5 0,75 1,00 2.00 . 1,00 3.30 0,75 
6 ~~ 0.50 2.00 0,75 4,30 0.75 7 ,vv 2,00 1.00 4.30 0.50 
8 0.75 0.50 1.00 0.00 2.20 0,35 
9 0.75 0,00 2.00 0.10 3.20 0.35 
10 0.75 0.50 2.00 0.50 2.30 0.20 
Mean 0,75 0.62500 1,80000 055000 3.07500 0.53600 
'Std, Dev. 0 0,32253 0.42164 0.43012 0,78218 0.39814 
Buyers I Beg. Mkt 1 Wealth Mkt 1 Beg. Mkt 2 Wealth Mkt2 Beg. Mkt 3 Wealth Mkt3 
11 125 as 2 0.5 2.8 a 
12 1,25 0.5 2 0.5 3.8 a 
13 1,25 0,25 2,5 1 3.3 0.5 
14 1.25 0.25 2,5 0,4 3.75 0.45 
15 1.25 1 3 0.25 4,25 0 
16 125 0.5 2 0.25 3.25 0.5 
17 1,25 0.25 2.5 0.62 4.3 0.63 1 
18 1,25 0.5 2 0.25 ~ 0.75. I 19 125 1 2 0 1.25 
Mean 1.25 0.52778 2.27778 041889 3.55000 0.45333 
Std. Dev. a 0.29167 0,36324 0.28563 0.50621 0.41455 
two data for the wealth-valuation relationship yields inconsistent results similar to 
one. Group two In two had the strongest positive "'!(.I,UVU between 
cumulative wealth and lottery ticket valuation of However in market three, group two 
sellers exhibited only a .18 positive correlation between these two variables. Group two sellers 
were the only hrr1""''''''' to have a positive correlation between cumulative wealth and lottery 
ticket valuation for both markets two three. 
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Group two buyers results are inconclusive. For market two, wealth and valuation were 
positively correlated at .26. Market three correlation is negative at -.19. The results for this 
subgroup are representative of the inconsistent observations relating to this hypothesis. 
Many factors can account for the inconsistent findings regarding wealth effects. The 
results from data relevant to this hypothesis indicate that there is no consistent bias induced by 
prior period gains represented by the cumulative wealth generated by subjects in prior period 
markets. Empirical evidence from prior experiments suggest that prior period gains influence 
current period decision making in a systematic and predictable manner; weak evidence 
supporting hypothesis H2a is observed in this experiment. 
Evidence of a "wealth effect" is also examined in the context of relating cumulative 
wealth position at the conclusion of the market three lottery to results from a risk assessment 
instrument administered after the final wealth position became known to the subject. This 
analysis tests the relationship between wealth level in a particular mental account and current 
risk propensity. The risk assessment instrument is scored in the following manner. For three of 
the bimodal options, the gamble's expected value exceeds the value of the lump sum alternative; 
subjects received .5 points each for taking the gamble for each of these three options. A second 
group of three bimodal options offered the choice between a gamble with expected value equal 
to the value of the lump sum alternative; for each accepted risk neutral gamble 1.0 point is 
received. The final set of three bimodal options offered the choice between a gamble with 
expected value less than the value of the lump sum alternative; for each accepted risk loving 
gamble 1.5 points are received. The sum of points earned for the nine bimodal options is 
. assigned to the subject as the risk assessment score, in an effort to segment subjects according to 
risk propensity, and draw conclusions about relative risk tolerance and valuation behavior. A 
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score of 0 to 1.5 classified a subject as low risk tolerant. 2.0 to 4.5 as medium risk tolerant, and 
5.0 to 9.5 as high risk tolerant. 
Hypothesis H2b states that final wealth position and risk level score will be positively 
correlated. This hypothesis is drawn to test for the existence of a wealth effect leading agents to 
a generally higher level of risk tolerance. This is due to prior period gains being integrated with 
potential losses incurred through accepting gambles that would otherwise not be considered had 
a prior period gain not been incorporated into the evaluation of the incremental outcomes of the 
gamble. 
For group one sellers, there is a weak. negative correlation of .16 between ending wealth 
and risk level. This evidence is contrary to what is expected if higher levels of wealth lead to 
more risk tolerant decision-making. For group one buyers, there is also a weak. negative 
correlation (-.08) between ending wealth and risk level. Both of these results offer no support of 
a positive relationship between wealth effect and risk tolerance, at least insofar as it is accurately 
measured by the risk assessment instrument (see table 5.7). 
Table 5.7: Group I Ending Wealth and Risk Level by Subject 
Sellers Ending Wealth Risk Level Buyers Ending Wealth Risk level 
1 5.15 3.5 14 4 2.5 
2 4.15 2 15 3.25 2.5 
3 2.35 0.5 16 3.5 4 
4 5.35 1.5 17 3.75 1.5 
5 4.15 2.5 18 3.5 4.5 
6 3.85 1.5 19 2.85 0.5 
7 4.85 1.5 20 2.85 4.5 
8 1.65 3.5 21 3.85 2.5 
9 4.35 0.5 22 3.75 2 
10 4.65 5 23 4.25 4.5 
11 3.85 2 24 3.85 2.5 
12 0.35 3.5 25 3.25 2.5 
13 2.35 2.5 26 4.85 1.5 
Mean 3.619230769 2.307692308 Mean 3.653846154 2.730769 
Std. Dev. 1.164375039 1.299654787 Std. Dev. 0.552819115 1.284773 
Correlation -0.155303586 Correlation -0.08055 
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Group two sellers ending wealth risk levels are slightly positively correlated at 
This is the only subgroup yielding a positive wealth-risk level relationship, and yet, it is a 
fairly weak positive relationship. This observation, when viewed in conjunction with results 
from the other subgroups, does not provide supporting of a wealth 
influencing ..... rr ......... 'ne.lr./ as """"";;'",'ltr,,'rI in the Group two buyers ending wealth 
levels risk again reflect a negative correlation (-.72). This fairly strong negative 
correlation may actually supports a reverse wealth effect. In this case, increased wealth would 
actually lead to more risk averse decision-making. This may be due to subjects' stronger desire 
to ..... r~·ep,nJ ... period gains than their to on a prospect with an outcome 
5.8). 
Table 5.8: Group 2 Wealth and Risk Level by ">UI'III;;"~l 
Sellers Ending Wealth Risk level Buyers Ending Wealth Risk level 
1 3,8 4.5 11 2.8 5 
2 3,7 7.5 12 3.8 0.51 
3 4.7 7.5 13 2.8 3.5 
4 2.7 4.5 14 3.75 1.5 
5 4.8 8.5 15 4.25 0.5 
6 3.8 3 16 3.75 2 
7 5,8 1.5 17 4.8 01 
8 2.7 1 18 3.75 2 
9 3.7 0 19 2.75 1, 
10 2.8 1.5 
Mean 3.85 3.95 Mean 3.605555556 1.777778 
Std. Dev. 1.012422837 3.050045537 Std. Dev. 0.704647272 1.602949 
Correlation 0.28695905 Correlation -0.71811 
There are many explanations why the wealth not more strongly manifest itself 
in the context of the experimental observations. One reason may that the risk assessment, 
which elicits hypothetical decision-making, true risk propensity. 
There exists no financial compensation for completing the risk assessment so there is no 
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financial incentive a subject to accurately complete the instrument. A second possible 
problem is that the actual relationship wealth level in a particular mental account does 
not influence risk propensity. If this is the case, even if the risk assessment instrument 
is representative of a subject's risk propensity, there would not a strong correlation between 
wealth and risk propensity. The evidence observed in this experiment only weakly supports the 
existence of a wealth effect, Hl.:l,VHli as how this phenomena is tested In experiment 
through an of wealth-valuation for individuals IS 
evidence that more wealth in the mental account the experimental relates to higher 
valuations by the individual relative to their prior period wealth and valuation leveL 
Observations individual behavior for both groups demonstrate weak support for hypothesis 
Given the high rl.:>",,..:>,, of variability in the valuations given by subjects, the tests for the 
wealth individuals nrl","""""'" more u ........... 'UE,A .... data the effect 
reason for this is that the wealth is specifically concerned with how in wealth 
reference position affect risk propensity (measured implicitly in lottery ticket valuation) in an 
individual's behavior, not group behavior. While an analysis the correlation between wealth 
and valuations is helpful in observing trends in wealth and valuation behavior, it is a less 
accurate measure of the persistence of the wealth 
The Effect of Risk Propensity: Evidence of the Endowment Effect 
In the experiment, a risk measurement instrument is used in an attempt to evaluate 
tolerance levels. instrument was structured as to delineate subjects into three groups, risk 
averse, neutral, and risk tolerant (higher scaled scores indicative of 
tolerance as measured by the instrument). 
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For group one. subjects as averse averaged valuations steadily 
across the three markets, irrespective ro les. Medium risk 
were in market one at to to the $.62-.64 level for 
The sole high-risk erratic valuation 
$.25 in market three to $.75 in there is no pattern 
v"".UH)::; risk propensity as measured by \.uu,",,,, to valuation leveL 
among data for any of the 00lrPO!lTP market data for one 
that as risk increased, valuations declined table 5.9) 
Table 5.9: Group 1 Valuations within Risk Level Classifications 
Number of 
Subjects 
low risk 
med risk 
high risk 
mkt 1 mkt 2 
5 0.7 
0.5 
mkt 3 avg. 
0.7 0.85 0.75 
0.59 0.7 0.606667 
0.67 0.57 0.59 
0.623529 0.596863 
0.75 0.25 0.5 
two 
one 
Group two indicated similar Low risk subjects valuations ranged from 
$.30 to $.64. Medium valuations ranged from to High risk 
subjects valuations $.41 to $.61. For each individual market two illustrates 
0 .. "''''1'.> .. risk levels with ... ,.... .. _. valuations. across three 
markets illustrates risk tolerance-valuation relationship. However, 
risk tolerant subjects two is higher than the risk averse group. It is 
31 
important to note risk neutral group valuation is the highest valuation 
for group two table 5.10). 
Table 5.10: Group 2 Valuations within Risk Level 
Number of I Subjects 
low risk mkt 1 mkt2 mkt3~ 0.4 7 
5 0.75 0.22 0.57 0.513333 
0.63889 0.3 0.472222 0.47037 1 
I 
medium risk 
3 0.5 0.25 0.36 0.37 
3 0.42 0.5 0.58 0.5 
0.46 0.375 0.47 0.435 
high risk 
3 0.65 0.57 0.54 0.586667 
1 0.5 0.5 0 0.333333 
0.6125 0.5525 0.405 0.523333 
results indicate little evidence of relationship of risk level as u.",...., ...... by the 
experimental instrument and valuation behavior. Therefore, support is not found hypothesis 
H3a, which states that for all market participants, higher valuations will be associated with 
due to the decreased discounting of by tolerant agents. 
An examination of level and valuation behavior across the buyer and subject 
. classifications indicates that the endowment effect can be examined without risk 
variation amongst corrupting results. 
For group one, low risk sellers valued the ticket more highly than low buyers for 
markets one, two, and three. Risk neutral subjects exhibited valuations than buyer 
markets one the vpr",op of the three For tolerant 
subjects, there is only data for one tolerant seller, and there were no risk tolerant buyers-
therefore data for risk tolerant is not in group one. Overall, 
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supporting the endowment effect among risk classified subjects is supported by data collected 
from group one. 
For group two, comparisons of low risk seller and low risk buyer valuations do not 
exhibit any discernable pattern supporting the endowment effect across risk classifications. Risk 
neutral sellers did exhibit dominant valuation behavior to risk neutral sellers, indicating 
supporting evidence of hypothesis H3b. Risk tolerant subjects also exhibited dominant seller 
valuations over buyer valuations for each of the three markets. It is important to note however, 
that there is only data for one risk tolerant seller in group two; and this subject exhibited erratic 
valuation behavior of $.50, $.50, and $0 for markets one through three respectively. 
Overall, there does exist some degree of support for hypothesis H3b that manifestation of 
the endowment effect induces higher valuations of the uncertain value good for sellers than 
buyers of similar risk tolerance. This data for groups one and two indicate that this phenomenon 
manifests itself with few exceptions that are described above. 
In summation, it is important to systematically analyze the impact of relative risk levels 
amongst subjects when testing for the endowment effect since this preference unavoidably 
influences valuation behavior in a market of goods with uncertain probability attached values. 
Since more risk tolerant subjects will discount the deviations in cash flows less (and in some 
cases assess a premium) than their risk averse counterparts, it is inevitable that risk tolerant 
subjects should exhibit higher valuations on average than similarly endowed risk tolerant 
subjects. The data for groups one and two support this hypothesis, however exceptions in the 
data do exist. 
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Chapter 6: Conclusions and Limitations 
In markets of uncertainty, framing effects can be a causal factor in economic decision-
making. These framing effects include, but are not limited to, reference position relative to 
entitlements and wealth level relative to gains and losses experienced in a particular market 
setting. Differences in risk tolerance are also an important determinant in the economic 
decision-making process. However, if it is assumed that risk tolerance preferences are 
distributed similarly across buyer and seller roles in a market, this factor should not affect the 
determination of the impact of framing effects on economic decision-making. In the context of 
this thesis, experimental markets are conducted to explore the predictive value of the value 
function of prospect theory, a descriptive theory of economic behavior that explains framing 
effects. 
Implications 
The prospect theory model implies the existence of an endowment effect manifested in 
higher seller prices than buyer prices. Prospect theory also describes and explains the "gambling 
with the house money" phenomenon. In the domain of gains in the prospect theory value 
function, more risk tolerant behavior is described in evaluating prospects with loss prospects less 
than the magnitude of the prior gain (cumulative wealth in the market setting). Furthermore, 
relative risk propensity is a factor in decision behavior in markets of uncertainty. This has 
obvious implications for assessing framing effects in market settings. Divergent risk propensity 
affects the manifestation of framing effects by increasing valuation level for all market 
participants. 
The existence of the endowment effect has the following policy implications. If 
economic valuation (indifference buy-sell value) is dependant upon reference position and 
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ownership enti tlement, are additional considerations in a.;::o~'<;;;;);::'l issues of eminent domain 
cases and "''' .. "\ ...... 1 issues in forced transactions existence of the 
endowment also changes expectations for number of transactions expected in a market 
setting that includes privately owned goods (i.e. secondary markets such as used automobiles). 
Other ", .. r'r.nf1<:>,-u markets, as financial markets, can also be subject to the endowment effect. 
manifestation endowment effect may arise due to information asymmetry in markets. 
If sellers have positive information, their perception of value will inherently be greater than 
buyers lacking positive information. owners of assets be 
susceptible to the endowment if a asset has n",.-tr.''TYI~.rI well for them in the past. 
This valuation of a "sunk gain" also representative of framing effects affecting valuation. An 
additional implication of the endowment and other framing is that regarding firm manager 
behavior. A manager that heavily invested in a failing project may be inclined to continue 
funding the even though other more profitable opportunities are available. Again, the 
effect of sunk costs can accmmt for this non-optimizing economic behavior. 
It is important to note that all unique goods are of uncertain value in the sense that it is 
difficult to assess the marginal utility associated with a good without actual transfer of ownership 
and consumption. leads to prospective buyers discounting the value of good due to 
in the resultant utility. While indicates another explanation justifying 
the lower buying than seller prices, is minimal of the endowment 
for exchange goods with known redemption value. 
The of a wealth effect due to the gambling with the house money observation 
also has One of most important implications is existence total 
wealth level being segregated into various "mental accounts," each relating to a certain market 
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or situation (i.e. a " ... .,ULV mental account and a stock market account). The 
of different mental accounts further validates the usefulness of prospect theory, that 
relative reference position and not total wealth is of importance in determining how ,-,u,,,.u~~,,,;) 
utility are 
Experimental Umitations 
experimental design employed is limited by a number of 
cOlnstrw.mrlg factors include the relevance the incentive structure and subject motivation, 
learning potential in the market setting, problems with the incomplete nature of the experimental 
market setting, and the viability of the risk assessment instrument in eliciting a representative 
measure of subject risk propensity. In addition, possible ways in which to 
limitations are discussed. 
Due to unavoidable financial constraints a relatively low financial incentive was involved 
in the experiment. The experimental markets were conducted during class time, meaning that 
subjects were a relatively captive audience. While financial compensation for subjects is 
intended to induce motivation, the magnitude the monetary incentive have 
inadequate eliciting actual preferences of the subjects. If the monetary incentives were 
inadequate to motivate the subjects and led to subjects not taking the experiment seriously, the 
results may not rp"'\rp,~pn More significant n'I(',n""r", could 
this potential problem. Subject motivation may also be adversely affected by informal 
communication in the experiment This could be addressed through the use of a private 
or a computer market setting where subjects are isolated from one another. 
second limitation area is seen in limited opportunity for written into the 
experimental design. The number markets was limited to due primarily to time 
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constraints. To assess whether subjects understand instructions a short test of understanding 
could be administered prior to the actual markets. In addition, a computer-assisted experiment 
with a help could explain points confusion. While the opportunity to 
questions was present the experimental design, subjects may have been reluctant due to 
the public setting of the experimental 
The employed was that of an incomplete that lacked a fixed supply 
of the structure was utilized to simplify transaction each of the markets. 
However, mechanism utilized to determine the exchange price of tickets led to a high 
supply and correspondingly low ex(:haJrlge price. Utilization of complete markets and market 
clearing mechanism would allow for the testing of undertrading in due to the 
endowment effect. 
An additional limitation of the experimental is seen utilization 
assessment instnunent as an accurate measure of subject propensity. No compensatory or 
incentive structure was connected to the subjects' completion of the risk assessment instnunent. 
Without monetary incentive, no explicit subject motivation exists. Difficulty in the 
determination actual risk ...... ".T.,,,"',, ... of subjects limits extent to which the 
level on of a setting. 
Future Research 
Experience with the present study strongly suggests several areas for potential future 
research. In addition to experimental modifications proposed to address the limitations 
in the prior section, testing the validity of the n""u'rlnt! and predictive value of the 
. prospect theory model has thus far relied upon data gathered in experimental market settings 
qualitative observations of actual market However, evidence supporting descriptive 
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and predictive value of the function has never provided form of data. 
The reason empirical data has not been utilized in prospect research is that it is difficult to 
gather the relevant information, or even determine what market would provide the most relevant 
data. Although it is difficult to gather the relevant empirical data, an empirical test of prospect 
is an important area of future research. It must noted that a complication 
in that prospect theory is a descriptive theory of individual behavior. Unfortunately, available 
empirical data aggregates individual behavior into market data. Expanding the scope of prospect 
theory into a descriptive theory of market behavior could allow for the 
testing the validity of prospect theory behavioral descriptions. 
In addition to the study of empirical data, another area of research includes further 
development prospect theory as a descriptive model economic decision-making. The 
framing effects of the endowment effect and wealth effect are two phenomena that are readily 
explained by 
decision 
theory. However, are other observed economic 
that may also explained by the prospect theory model. 
This thesis represents an attempt to test for evidence of framing effects impacting the 
economic decision-making process. Furthermore, the manner in which framing effects can 
significantly affect the economic decision-making process can be seen through a qualitative 
assessment of empirical evidence. The prospect Tnp.r\T"'U model can account for describe why 
and how framing effects systematically influence economic decision-making. This is an 
important development in light of the fact that expected utility theory and rational agent 
hypothesis are the descriptive of economic decision making. 
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Instructions for Buyers 
You have a $1 .25 credit and the opportunity to buy a lottery ticket. This will occur three 
times, in short periods we will call 'markets .' At the beginning of each market, you will be 
asked how much a lottery ticket is worth to you. These tickets will payout either $1.00 
or $0.00, determined at the close of each period by a random card drawing. Whether 
anyone ticket is a winner is independent of what happens with the other tickets. 
In the second line on the table below, please write down how much a lottery ticket is 
worth to you. Don't fill in anything else yet! Raise your hand after you have done this . 
The purchase price of a ticket, which will be called the 'market price,' will be determined 
by assessing the values assigned to the tickets by all participants. The coordinator will 
tell you what the market price is after the values assigned to the tickets by all 
participants are collected. If the amount you are willing to pay for the ticket is higher 
than the market price, you will buy a ticket at the market price. Otherwise, you will not 
buy a ticket, and receive your money. 
At the end of each market, people with tickets will find out if they win the lottery. Each 
lottery ticket has a number on it, and the coordinator will draw a playing card from a 
shuffled deck for each lottery ticket. A red card (hearts or diamonds) means that ticket 
number 1 is a winner and is worth $1 .00. A black card (clubs or spades), ticket number 
1 is a loser and worth nothing. The payout on each successive ticket will be determined 
in the same manner. 
At the conclusion of each lottery, please fill out the remaining sections of the table. 
Information in this market setting is strictly private. You will likely lose money by sharing 
your information with other market participants. 
This is real money, yours to keep! You get to keep any money given to or earned by you 
during the course of the three markets. Payment will occur after market three. 
Market 
---
Starting money and ticket number $1 .25 
How much money is a lottery ticket worth $ 
to you? (please enter an amount) 
What is the price determined by the $ 
market? (will be given by coordinator after 
sheets are collected and handed back) 
Did you buy a ticket? (check one) Yes No 
How much money do you have left? $ 
What ticket number did you buy? (enter ticket no. did not buy a ticket __ 
number or check 'did not buy a ticket') 
Did your ticket win? (check one) one win no win 
How much do lowe you for your ticket? 
--
$1.00 __ $0.00 
(check one) 
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Instructions for Sellers 
You have a $.75 credit and a lottery ticket, and the opportunity to buy an additional 
ticket, or sell ticket you have. This opportunity will occur in short periods 
we will call 'markets.' At the beginning market, you will be how much your 
lottery ticket is worth to you. These tickets will out either $1.00 or $0.00, determined 
at the of each period by a random card Whether one ticket is a 
winner is independent of what happens with the other tickets. 
In the second on the table below, write down how much a lottery ticket is 
worth to you. Don't fill in anything else yet! Raise your hand after you have done this. 
exchange price a ticket, which will called the price,' will be determined 
by assessing the values assigned to the tickets all participants. The coordinator will 
tell you what market price is after the values assigned to the tickets by all 
participants are collected. If the amount you value the ticket at is higher than the 
price, you will buy an additional ticket at the market Otherwise, you will sell your 
ticket, and the and money. 
At end each people with tickets will out if they win lottery. Each 
lottery ticket has a number on it, and the coordinator will draw a playing card from a 
shuffled deck for lottery ticket. A red card (hearts or diamonds) means ticket 
number 1 is a winner and is worth $1.00. A black card (clubs or spades), means ticket 
number 1 is a loser and worth nothing. The payout on each successive ticket will 
determined in the same manner. 
At the conclusion lottery, fill out 
Information in market setting is strictly 
your information with other market participants. 
This real money, yours to 
by you during the course 
three. 
Market __ 
• Starting money and ticket number 
• How much money is a lottery ticket worth 
• to you? (please an amount) 
What is the price determined by the 
market? (will be given by coordinator after 
are collected and handed back) 
I Did you buy a second ticket? (check one) 
How much money you left? 
What ticket num ber did you buy? (enter 
! $.75 
$ 
$ 
$ 
ticket 
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remaining selctlcms of the 
You will likely lose by sharing 
any money g to or earned 
Payment will occur after market 
ticket 
__ No 
did not buy a 
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Would you prefer (a) or (b) in the following scenarios: 
a. receiving $50 
b. a 50% chance of receiving $150 and a 50% chance of receiving $0 
a. receiving $60 
b. a 50% chance of receiving $100 and 50% chance of receiving $40 
a. receiving $50 
b. a 50% chance of receiving $120 and a 50% chance of receiving $10 
a. receiving $60 
b. a 50% chance of receiving $120 and a 50% chance of receiving $0 
a. receiving $60 
b. a 60% chance of receiving $90 and a 50% chance of receiving $30 
a. receiving $52.50 
b. a 50% chance of receiving $100 and 50% chance of receiving $5 
a. receiving $60 
b. a 50% chance of receiving $100 and a 50% chance of receiving $0 
a. receiving $70 
c. a 50% chance of receiving $80 and a 50% chance of receiving $40 
a. receiving $75 
b. a 50% chance of receiving $120 and a 50% chance of receiving $8 
Sex: Female Male 
Age: 
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L Wealth Effect Data: group I 
II. Wealth Effect Data: group 2 
III. Endowment Effect Data: group I 
IV. Endowment Effect Data: group 2 
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group one I 
~----.-
Sellers Beg. Mkt 1 Mkt 1 Beg . Mkt 2 Mkt 2 Beg. Mkt 3 Mkt 3 Ending W€ Risk Levell 
- -
1 0.75 0.6 3 0.51 4.5 0.51 5.15 3.5 
---- --- - ------ --1-- ~
2 0.75 0_38 2 0.6 3.5 0_6 4.15 2 
- ----- --
-=-=-
- _ ._ ----
0_75 
--- -: _.-;-1 
3 0.75 0.75 1 3 0_85 2_35 0.51 
._-------- ---,--- --:-=- - - -_ .. - .--.-1------
- ------1 4 0_75 0.75 3 0_75 5 1 5_35 1.5 
- - ~--. 
5 0.75 0.01 2 0.25 3.5 0.5 4.15 2.5 
6 0.75 0.5 2 0.51 3.5 0.65 3.85 1.5 
7 0.75 0.5 2 0.5 3.5 0.75 4.85 1.5 
------ - " .... --_ ... 
8 0.75 1 1 0.75 1 0.5 1.65 3.5 
9 0.75 1 2 1 4 1 4.35 0.5 
10 0.75 0.5 2 0.75 4 0.25 4.65 5 
- ---_. 
11 0.75 0.25 2 0.5 3.5 1 3.85 2 
12 0.75 1 1 0.75 1 0.76 0.35 3.5 
13 0_75 0.5 2 0.75 3 1 2.35 2.5 
- - ---
0.643846 3.30-7692 --0.720769 --.' .. 2.307692 Mean 0.75 0.595385 1.923077 3.619231 
-.- .---f---.- ---- --- ---_._ - - ------ '---._-_._- - _ .. _._-_. __ ._- -.-~---.-.--. -- . . _ . . _- . . _'. _.'-' .. _---
Std. Dev. 0 0.300517 0.640513 0.189012 1.164375 0.243942 1.164375 1.299655 
- ._- _._----
----- - ------,---- ._- - - - -- --- - - -------
Correlation -0.23827 0.106183 -0.1553
' - -
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gr~up two ! 
Sellers ~~L~~W~alth Mkt 1 Beg. Mkt 2 Wealth Mkt 2 Beg. Mkt 3 Wealth Mkt 3 Ending Wealth Risk level j 
-------- - --:-
-2 - ----~r_----------=_::_ f--- - -- - - ----::-- ---- ----- ---- --- ---.--- '-'. -1 0.75 1 1.25 2.55 1.5 3.8 4.5 
- -- - ---,:-
-- ------- ---- f--- _____ ~_ • _ _ 0 ----_._- -- .-
2 0.75 0.5 2 0.25 3.2 0.36 3.7 7.5 
3 0.75 0.45 - - --2 0.45 3.2 0.5 4.7 
________ ____ J :~ 
- -- 1- ------- --- -- ------- - - - - --
4 0.75 0.8 1 0.2 2.2 0.1 2.7 4.5 
- - - - -
._----
------------ ---
--- -- -8.5: 5 0.75 1 2 1 3.3 0.75 4.8 
---- ----
'--- ---
--j 
6 0.75 0.5 2 0.75 4.3 0.75 3.8 3 
-- - -----= -- -- ----- --
7 0.75 1 2 1 4.3 0.5 5.8 1.5 
- _ ._. -- . . _---- -
-- .-- ---
--
-1 - - - ------ 1--. -8 0.75 0.5 0 2.2 0.35 2.7 1 
---_ .-. ---
-_ .. _- -_._ -_ .. __ ._ -
-0 f---------- -- - 0.35 _._- -- ---9 0.75 2 0.1 3.2 3.7 0 
- - _._. -- . . _---. 
--1----- -- - -- ----=_ --------- -------- -_._----
10 0.75 0.5 2 0.5 2.3 0.2 2_8 1.5 
_. . " . . . - ._ - . --- --------- - - ... . ---- -_._--- 1-- -- --- -- --- - - ----- --- - .. -- ,-. --- _. - --- -. -- - -- ----------- --------- - - ------ .. . ". . .... ... - _ .. _ .. --_ . 
Mean 0.75 0.625 1.8 0.55 3.075 0.536 3.85 3.95 
- --
-- - -- --
--- ---_ .- ,._- - --- _._-_ .... _._-- _.-_ .. ---1------------ -- -. "_ . _ . __ .- . " .. _. . .. 
Std.Oev. 0.322533375 0.421637021 0.430116263 0.782180002 0.398140121 1.012422837 3.050045537 
.- - .-. -_ . . . ". - - -
- -- ---- - --- ----- - - ----- --------- -- - -- --------r--_- ------ -- -- - - "'_ . --- _ .. . - - . . . . . - -- --
Correlation 0.551410967 0.183147766 0.28695905 
---- - - -- --
- -- ------~-------- - . - . - -- -----. - - - - --_ . . 
Buyers Beg. Mkt 1 Wealth Mkt 1 Beg. Mkt 2 Wealth Mkt 2 Beg. Mkt 3 Wealth Mkt 3 Ending Wea)th_ Risk level 
--------=--=- - - ---------=- -. - -- -_. -- - - -11 1.25 0.5 2 0.5 2.8 0 2.8 5 
12 1.25 0.5 2 0.5 3.8 0 3.8 0.5 
13 1.25 0.25 2.5 1 3.3 0.5 2.8 3.5 
-.,------ '--- --
14 1.25 0.25 2.5 0.4 3.75 0.45 3.75 1.5 
-.--._--- . - _. '----- --
15 1.25 1 3 0.25 4.25 0 4.25 0.5 
. __ . . - . _-_ . ... -
--- - - -- - - -- ------ - ._------- -- - - -----~--.- -- .- - --- - ---- -- -
16 1.25 0.5 2 0.25 3.25 0.5 3.75 2 
---_._ - - 6:63 -------------17 1.25 0.25 2.5 0.62 4.3 4 .8 0 
- - - - --
1.25 
--.. 
-
-- -
----
-------- _ .. 
18 0.5 2 0.25 3.25 0.75 3.75 2 
--- -.- - - - -----_ ._- -------- ------- -- ---- -- ------- 1------ - - - ----- ----_._- _._- --- -- - - - -_ . -._-- - _ .. _-
19 1.25 1 2 0 3.25 1.25 2.75 1 
._-_ .... - --. . -- _ . . -_ ._ - - _. _ ----_._-- . 
----------
---_._- _._-_._- -- - - . .... -. .. _. __ . __ .. . -" -. . ... - -- . -_ . ... - .. - .. _.- - . - . .. .. --
Mean 1.25 0.527777778 2.277777778 0.418888889 3.55 0.453333333 3.605555556 1 .77777777 8 
- -
. _ . . . -- - - .'-- . __ .. - - 1-- .. . . . . - ._- . . - -
- 0-.4145479471 O.7g4~!7_222 -=b~~~~l~-~~~I Std.Oev. 0.291666667 0.363241579 0.285632826 0.506211418 ------- --1--- -- -- ------ - ~ O~256349581 ------Correlation -0.186145838 
- - - - - -
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group one 
=----
mkt price 0.5 0.75 0.65 
-
----- f-:---Sellers Mkt 1 Mkt 2 Mkt 3 Average Risk level Sex ~~e_ 1 ~-
-0:6 _._---_ . . ---:- ---- ---- .- - ---~ --- ---::-::-r------ M--1 0.51 0.51 0.54 3.5 20 
---- - . .. 
--- -- ---- ------- ~526666667 .- 1--__ .-2 0.38 0.6 0.6 2 M 211 
"- - - 20 3 0.75 0_75 0.85 0_783333333 0.5 M 
4 0.75 0.75 1 0.833333333 1.5 F 21 
5 0_01 0_25 0.5 0_253333333 2.5 M 26 
6 0_5 0_51 0.65 0.553333333 1.5 M 20 
7 0.5 0.5 0_75 0.583333333 1.5 M 24 
8 1 0.75 0.5 0.75 3.5 F 20 
9 1 1 1 1 0.5 -1=-- 21 
_._- - ---=-=-
-.-------
__ - 0.-_-
20 10 0.5 0.75 0_25 0.5 5 F 
r--- 1--- ._-- ----- - .- f- - ----- - , .. _--- 1---' 
11 0.25 0.5 1 0.583333333 2 M 20 
------- - '--' ----- - - -- ----
._-- _. -
-- - - r - --I 
12 1 0.75 0.76 0.836666667 3.5 F 20 1- -- - - - --- ---------- - " '.--~- -_. __ .- ._-- _ .. "- I---- - - .-::-:;::- --- - ---
-W 13 0.5 0.75 1 0.75 2.5 . M 
.-- f-05953-846f5' 06438461-54 r--o.-i20769231 I- -0-:-653333333 r----- .. - - -Mean 2.307692308 
ojOO!516649 - - " _._--_ ._-- .. --_._. _ _ .. . _._ - . . . _ - - --- --- -- --._- - - ---1- --- - -- -Std. Dev. 0.189012277 0.243941986 0.194503166 1.299654787 
--- --- --- ---
1--,,--- , - - - - - -<--- - .. _-- - -_ . - - .-. -- -- - -- -
- - - - - -
Covariance" -0.017426036 -0.024260355 -0.207928994 -0.083205128 
--- -- --- -_ .. _-- ----- --- "- - - ...... _- _ .. -._-" 
__ .n __ "_. _ • • _ _ 
_ .. . _- - _ .. - - _ . .. __ .. .. -.--
----, _ .. ... "- " -- . . . .. - . 
Correlation" -0.04833527 -0.106989518 -0.710497565 -0.356580439 
--
_._ - - -
- - -- - - -- - 1------ -
"between price and risk level 
~. 
Mkt1 Mkt 2 Mkt 3 ~verage Risk level Sex ~11~ ~lJyer~ 
- ---.--- - - -_.,,-:-= M --14 0.42 0.75 0.25 0.473333333 2_5 20 
15 0.5 0.25 0.3 0.35 2.5 M 21 
- ' 16 0.5 0.75 0.5 0.583333333 4 F 20 
- -
17 0.4 0.5 0_5 0.466666667 1.5 F 21 
18 0.95 0.8 0.6 0.783333333 4.5 M 20 
------._- - --- -- ------ - .- ---- - - -.----- _ . . ------- .- .- - -- ------- - .=-=- ----- _.-
19 0.5 0.75 1 0.75 0.5 F 20 
- ----- -·----25 - - -- --- --_ ."---_._. 1--. 0.75 0.5 1 0.75 4.5 M 20 
------ - -
21 0.4 0.5 0.75 0.55 2.5 M 19 
- --
- ---_._- - 1---------. 
22 0.35 0.55 0.4 0.433333333 2 M 21 
--_._- ---_.- ----.--.--.---
-.- --- - - .--. -- -- -.--- --
--_._._-- ._ ._- -- - - ._------ -_. - - ._-_._-
23 0.75 0.6 0.5 0.616666667 4.5 F 21 
- --- --- - --- -. 
--- --- --- _ .. - - _. __ .. _--- . 1---_._.- '- '-' . . - -_._----- . . . .. . . 
24 0.45 0.75 1 0.733333333 2.5 M 21 
25 0.5 0.75 0.65 0.633333333 -2:51-' F 19, 
26 0.75 0.75 0.75 0.75 1.5 ~- 20 -------
-'0.536153846 0.669230769 0.611538462 0.605641026 2.730769231 
1---'_- ; 
Mean 
"-' .-. _  . __ .. .. _-- -_ ... __ •.. _-
- ... . . _- - _. - - -
---_ .'--- . _-- -- ....• -- ' - ' - ,-- -- 1-'- '" - - .-. _ - - -- - « - •• _TO . - __ . _ - --- -_ ..•. - _. _. - .-
Std. Dev. 0.173663394 0.186568197 0.236426386 0.143393945 1284772753 
- ---- - - -- --- ------. -- - -
r-<1093579882 
1--': '--- -.- . -.- . - -.---- _ ._ ._.- f-- .- - -. - - - 1--------_._- -------_. --- I- "-Covariance· 0.068639053 -0.064201183 0.032672584 
._-- -_. __ . _ - -
0.45437036"3 
- -_ . ---- - ... - -_ .. _--- -- - _._ - - - - _ .. .. --- ---. --- ---
Correlation" 0.31021976 -0.228972264 0.192127025 
f-:-:--- . . ------_. .-1---- ---- 1---
"between price and risk level 
- - -
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~r.0UP._two 
. _- --_. __ .'.-_ .. . _._----_ .. - - - - - - -.. _-- _. __ . 
- --- --- -----
. - ---- -- ._- _.- - - - - .. _---_ . 
--
- .--. -.. -
-- ---- --.--.- --- . . - --- ---.. ------.-- 1-- -- --- -- - -_._-- ----- --- -- 1-- ---- - " .. - - - . 
mkt price 0.5 0.45 0.5 
... _ .- . -.- . . _-_ .._ -- - - --- 1--- -- - - --- _._ ...• __ . . _-- --" - - .. _._----- - - -_._- ._ ._ . -:- - - - -- --- - -. - .. ---
"." - _. - ---
., - ---- -- f-::---- •... . -
Sellers Mkt 1 Mkt 2 Mkt 3 Average Risk level Sex ~~~ 
--
1 1 1.25 1.5 1.25 4.5 M 24 
.- .. 
2 0.5 0.25 0.36 0.37 7.5 M 33 
3 0.45 0.45 0.5 0.466666667 7.5 F 
4 0.8 0.2 0.1 0.366666667 4.5 F 22 
5 1 1 0.75 0_916666667 8.5 F 21 
---6 0.5 0.75 0.75 0.666666667 3 F 21 
7 1 1 0.5 0.833333333 1.5 F 22 
- - •. - . 
--
8 0.5 0 0.35 0.283333333 1 M 22 
-_. __ .. _. 
------~ - -- •.. - -
9 0 0.1 0.35 0.15 0 M 40 
- . _ ._ - -
- - - _ .. . _._ .. . _ . ... 
- --- -- - f----- . . - 1-:-:' - - . 10 0.5 0.5 0.2 0.4 1.5 M 23 
-- -- - - .. • --- ----- --- -_. - . . - --. - . .. .. - -..... _- -... _- -- -- . ..•.. . - . __ . - . .-.. . _ . . - . 
Mean 0.625 0.55 0_536 0.570333333 3.95 
- --- -- - " . -_ . -
o.430f1626-3 - O_39S'14012f -'._- ."-----~-=-
--:: ._ - - -- _ . - . .. .. _. ,_ . .. 
-'.-
Std . Oev. 0.322533375 0.340059726 3.050045537 
- " ._ - ---. _ ----- - _ . -- --- _ .. - ._ - . . - " .. - -- - -_. --- - - . .. " .-._ - --_ ._ - -- ._- - - --- ---- - -.. __ . .... - -_ .. .. - - .-. - - - .. - --- . 
Covariance* 0.32875 0.305 0.2503 0.294683333 
- .. - . -- .- .. _-_._----.. --- --- -_. - _ .. - --_.------- ----_ . -_ ... '---_ .-.-. - _. , '" -- ._ ... __ . . - . _. -. - . -" .. - -- "- -- - -.--- --- ---- .~ . . _. -_ .... - .. 
Correlation* 0.371314807 0.258324229 0.229021404 0.315683251 
.. _ . .. ----- ----_ .. _---- ._- -- .- - --- - --- - -_. - _. -------. . - - .. . ----_.-- -.- .. . __ . 
- -'--- . ---
_. _ . . -
*~e~wee.!!J>rice _an<:!.!:!~~ level 
Mkt 3 --~-. ---_. -Bu}'e~s . _ _____ . _ _ . _ __ Mkt 1 Mkt 2 Average Risk level Sex Age 
. -- _. __ . ... . _ - - ~- - -- . -----:::-
r--0.333333333 
.. - - ------
11 0.5 0.5 0 5 F 23 
.. - - .- - ._-_ ._- _._-_ . . --~ 1---- ---- - -
-0 ~- --12 0.5 0.5 0.333333333 0.5 M 26 
. . 
.. - - - ------.---- - - - - --
,--.. _ .. _._-_. - -- -_.- ~ _ ___ 0---
-
- - --_._ - - -_.,- ._- - . -
13 0.25 1 0.5 0.583333333 3.5 M 21 
--_ .. - .. --- - . - - _. - _ ... _-.- -- - -- _. _ . - - - --- -- - - . - ."" 
- --- .------- . --~ . . --.-... -- --- .- - --
-. . _ .. 
14 0.25 0.4 0.45 0.366666667 1.5 F 22 
- -- . _. - . .. _------ - --- -----.- --- -_. - - - - .-------- -
15 1 0.25 0 0.416666667 0.5 M 21 
16 0.5 0.25 0.5 0.416666667 2 M 31 
- . r--- -- - _ ... . --_ .. - ._-- - - f--. 
17 0.25 0.62 0.63 0.5 0 M 21 
-
18 0_5 0.25 0.75 0.5 2 M 22 
19 1 0 1.25 0.75 1 F--
1--'-" 
22 
'- -"--" ------ --~.----. 
'-0.453333333 --- --
--_._-
Mean 0.527777778 0.418888889 0.466666667 1.777777778 
-----
f-------. - .- - - -,... -
Std. Oev. 0.291666667 0.285632826 0.414547947 0.13540064 1.602948672 
._-
--
I--. ----
Covariance* -0.104938272 0.141419753 -0.119814815 -0.027777778 
1--::- -
-0.252510833 0.347484042 -0.202847033 -0.143982493 Correlation* 
---1---0 - 1-- ,--,- -.- _ . . _ ._ . . 
"between price and risk level 
- - - -- - - -
. 
-
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